AI Governance
How TRAXX's AI is controlled, scoped, audited, and isolated. Built for Indian regulated industries — BFSI, pharma, healthcare, government — where AI access is a compliance question, not just a feature toggle.
What "AI Governance" actually means
When a CIO or compliance officer asks "is your AI safe", they mean five very specific things. Here's how TRAXX answers each.
Permission-scoped access
Every page-permission row in TRAXX has six independent flags: canView, canCreate, canUpdate, canDelete, canProcess, and canAi. The AI flag is independent — a user can read PO records but be blocked from invoking the AI on them.
AccessManagementInterceptor line 93–95 — "For AI pages, also check canAi flag."Default-deny
The can_ai column defaults to 0 (deny). New users, new roles, new pages — none of them get AI access until an administrator explicitly grants it. There is also a global AI_FEATURE:USE role permission that gates the entire AI subsystem.
ADD can_ai BIT NOT NULL DEFAULT 0.Full audit trail
Every AI tool call passes through AuditInterceptor: user ID, tenant code, tool name, input arguments, returned record IDs, IP, user-agent, timestamp. The audit table is the same one your statutory auditor reviews — AI activity is just another row class.
Tenant data isolation
Multi-tenant by design — each customer has their own database. TenantContext (an InheritableThreadLocal) is set in JwtAuthFilter before any DB call and cleared in finally. MultiTenantDataSource routes the AI's tool calls only to that tenant's database — there is no shared schema across customers.
Open-source agent framework
The AI is orchestrated by Dify — an open-source agent framework. Every prompt, every tool selection, every reasoning step is inspectable inside Dify Studio. No black box. Your InfoSec team can review the workflow before any deployment.
Why the AI never touches your database directly
The boundary that matters: the AI sees only what your tool callbacks return. Tools are server-side endpoints under your permission system. Even if the AI is told to "give me all vendor details", the tool callback enforces what the user can see.
canAi, then return only what the user is allowed to see — same as if the user had clicked the page themselves.
If your DD checklist mentions RBI or DPDPA, read this.
RBI AI/ML guidance alignment
- ✓ §3 Explainability — open-source Dify, inspectable workflows
- ✓ §4 Accountability — full AuditInterceptor trail
- ✓ §5 Model risk management — hallucination guards, response sanitization
- ✓ §6 Data governance — permission-scoped tool callbacks
DPDPA principles alignment
- ✓ Sec 8(2) Purpose limitation — AI access bound to user's role
- ✓ Sec 8(7) Storage limitation — audit log retention configurable
- ✓ Sec 8(4) Accuracy — every AI claim cites source records
- ✓ Sec 11 Data principal rights — user can request AI activity log on their data
On-premise deployment & model selection — roadmap
For BFSI customers with stricter requirements, the following are on the active roadmap:
- Q3 2026 — Model abstraction layer (Claude / Anthropic alongside OpenAI; per-tenant model selection)
- Q3 2026 — Data classification with AI opt-out per data class (PAN, Aadhaar, KYC documents)
- Q4 2026 — Single-tenant on-premise / VPC deployment package
- Q4 2026 — Pen-test report covering the AI surface specifically
Compliance team questions
Is the AI sandboxed? +
canAi flag. It is not a runtime sandbox in the JVM/container sense, but it is functionally equivalent for the buyer's compliance question: the AI cannot see, or act on, anything the user is not allowed to. Per-tenant Dify workspace isolation is on the Q4 2026 roadmap.Which LLM does it use? +
Where does the AI run? +
Can our InfoSec team review the AI workflow before go-live? +
Can we get an audit-trail extract for a specific time window? +
Send this page to your compliance team
If your DD checklist asks AI-governance questions, this is the page to share. Schedule a session to walk through the architecture with your InfoSec lead.